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Abstract
Using a unique set of electoral rules present in the Austrian state of Vorarlberg, we
explore the question whether direct election of the mayor affects the size of local govern-
ments. Using difference-in-differences estimation and propensity score matching, we find
evidence that direct elections of the mayor are associated with lower expenditure on public
administration and public personnel, and higher expenditure in the visible categories of
spending i.e. transportation infrastructure and subsidies to the economy.
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1. Introduction
The relationship between fiscal federalism and the size of the public sector remains
an area in which no clear empirical picture prevails. Recent analyses of fiscal federalism
highlight that office–oriented politicians might abuse their power over the local budgets ac-
cording to their own objective functions, e.g. involvement in rent extraction or corruption.
Most theories of competitive federalism support the existence of smaller public sectors in
decentralized countries, on the basis of the argument that local decision makers are more
accountable to local voters and therefore have few opportunities to misbehave. Moreover,
if the taxes are raised at the local level, the local population will keep a close watch on
the efficiency of provision of public services financed from their own pockets. Therefore,
political accountability at the local level should provide a strong incentive to the politicians
to reduce inefficient spending as well as involvement in rent seeking.
Wide literature addresses the question of whether fiscal performance at the local level
affects the reelection probabilities. Following the seminal articles of Nordhaus (1975) and
Rogoff et al. (1990), Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), find in the new–democracy con-
text that pre-electoral manipulation of fiscal instruments increases the incumbent’s chances
of getting reelected, while Veiga and Veiga (2007) use data from Portuguese municipalities
and speculate that higher expenditures over the whole term (and specifically in election
years) increase the chances of political success. This literature suggests that incumbents
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have the incentive to expand the budgets of the municipalities in order to affect their
reelection probabilities.
In this work, we want to explore the question of whether direct election of the mayor,
which affects the incentives of politicians, matters for the size of local government spending
using a unique set of electoral rules present in the Austrian federal state of Vorarlberg.
Arguably, the three parallel voting systems in place in Vorarlberg represent an original
source of variation in electoral incentives of the incumbents. We want to analyze whether
direct election of the mayor has an effect on the overall levels of local expenditure as well
as the composition of the expenditure.
Previous literature exploiting the differences in local electoral systems focused mostly
on Swiss cantonal and municipal elections as well as German electoral law reforms. Pom-
merehne (1978) exploits the fact that in the 1970s some Swiss municipalities were direct
democracies whereas others used a representative democratic system, finding that the
median voter model better reflects the pattern of expenditures if decisions are made di-
rectly. Similarly, Feld and Kirchga¨ssner (1999) find that direct democracy has an impact
on debt levels of municipalities. More recent literature analyzes some fiscal aspects of
electoral rules for the German municipalities that have undergone a change in the electoral
regime. Ko¨thenbu¨rger et al. (2013) find that municipalities with appointed mayors react
less strongly to changes in fiscal incentives. The change in municipal tax rates is three
times smaller compared with a system of direct mayoral elections. Similarly, Hessami
(2014), using the case of Hesse, reveals that municipalities with a directly elected mayor
attract 5% more investment transfers from the state. This effect only materializes in the
election year, which suggests that mayors under the new electoral rule put more effort
into grant applications for highly visible infrastructure projects in order to increase their
re-election probability. Blume et al. (2008) find that change to directly elected mayors has
led to lower expenditures and revenues in the German state Schleswig-Holstein compared
with Baden-Wuerttemberg, where direct elections were used all along. However, the anal-
ysis suffers from the fact that expenditures are aggregated at the state-level. Egger et al.
(2007) focus on the introduction of direct mayor elections in Lower Saxony. The authors
find that local spending increases with direct mayor elections, in particular redistributive
spending. Unfortunately, this setting does not allow the authors to distinguish whether the
effect on spending levels can be attributed to electoral incentives or to the increased power
of the mayor which give the latter more room for decision making. Finally, Ade (2014)
analyzes a switch of mayor appointment by the local council to direct mayor elections in
three German states and provides evidence that tax rates are lower and public spending is
higher with directly elected mayors.
We contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First of all, we analyze whether
the electoral incentives matter not only for the size but also the composition of local ex-
penditure. Arguably, expenditure categories visible to the voters should be affected in a
different way than the categories that are not directly observed, and therefore less relevant
for reelection prospects. Secondly, we are able to identify the effect of the direct election
stemming only from the electoral incentives and independent of any changes to the compe-
tences of the mayor, or the way he or she is recalled from office. Finally, since we concetrate
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on one region only, we are able to eliminate most of the unobservable characteristics that
could differentiate the municipalities in a cross–country or a cross–regional sample.
We believe that the set of presented rules offers a unique opportunity to explore the
research questions. Unlike for the case of cross–country studies and country–level studies,
there are comparatively few factors that would affect the fiscal outcomes and differentiate
the local entities. Municipalities in the analyzed region differ in terms of some demographic
and economic variables, for which we control, but do not differ in terms of budgeting rules
or access to central government transfers, as these are either centrally or regionally (for
the whole of Bundesland) predetermined. Some differences in the access to financing stem
from the fiscal equalization scheme, which aims at reducing the discrepancies between
the municipal ”financial strength” (Finanzkraft), i.e. providing the means necessary for
the municipalities to perform a basic provision of public services. These differences are
controlled for as explained in Section 3.
Our main results show that when the mayor is elected directly, we observe less expendi-
ture on personnel, public administration and privately provided services, and at the same
time higher expenditure on transportation infrastructure and promotion of the economy,
the latter category comprising different kinds of direct subsidies to economic agents. The
overall level of expenditure remains unaffected.
In the next section, we present the institutions present in Vorarlberg and formulate
hypotheses about the impact of these institutions on the levels of public expenditure.
Section 3 presents the dataset, variables used in the regression, and the methodology of
analysis. Section 4 presents the main results and Section 5 concludes the work.
2. Institutions and hypotheses
2.1. Institutional background
The state (German: Bundesland) of Vorarlberg is the westernmost federation state
of Austria. It is further divided into 96 municipalities (Gemeinden) of diverse size and
area. Mostly populated is Dornbirn with 47,420 inhabitants whereas the least populated
Du¨nserberg inhabits only 144 members of the community. Municipalities in Austria and in
particular in Vorarlberg are divided into three administrative categories typically associated
with size: normal municipalities, market municipalities, and cities. There are currently 80
normal municipalities, 11 market municipalities, and 5 cities in Vorarlberg.
Typically, in most European democracies electoral rules at the local level are centrally
governed. In federal states, electoral rules may differ at the state level, for instance in
Germany and Austria. In Austria the latter is true for most federal states: state law
governs electoral laws for municipal elections. Austria has undergone a series of reforms,
each state switching from the indirect to the direct election of the mayor: in 1991 the state
of Carinthia, in 1992 Burgenland and Tirol, in 1994 Salzburg, in 1997 Upper Austria and
in 2000 the state of Vorarlberg1 The reform has taken a unique form in the federal state
1Styria, Lower Austria and Vienna still choose their mayors indirectly.
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of Vorarlberg. The electoral rules are set at the local level and since the year 2000 three
parallel systems have been in place: semi–open list for the municipal council together with
a direct election of the mayor, semi–open list system often connected with preselection of
the list members by the electorate, and finally an open election in which each eligible voter
freely decides on whom to elect as a the member of the municipal council. Before the year
2000, all municipalities have used a semi–open party system without the direct election of
the mayor.
In the semi–open list system, the local parties populate the party lists as well as suggest
candidates for the office of the mayor. Eligible electors can place one vote for a list to the
municipal council and one vote for a mayor’s office candidate. Additionally, each voter may
place up to five votes for individual candidates on the chosen list. If in a direct election of
the mayor only one candidate stands for the election, voters can still utilize a Yes/No poll.
In 2015, 60 out of 96 municipalities conducted an election according to these rules.
The second variant is a different version of a semi–open list party system. It is often
preceded by a consultation with the electorate. Parties either send empty polls to the
voters, who then place the names of desired candidates on the lists, or send a preselected
candidate lists and voters may decide on the order of placement. The mayor is, however,
not directly elected but chosen by the council of the municipality among their freshly
elected members. In 2015, the system was used in 20 municipalities.
The last system is entirely open. Each voter receives an empty voting sheet on which
he or she is eligible to place names of desired members of the municipal council freely
chosen from all members of the community with a passive suffrage. The voter can choose
a number of names up to a double of the arranged seats in the local council. The newly
elected members of the council subsequently choose the mayor among themselves. In 2015,
this rule was used in 16 municipalities.
The role of the mayor in local decision making is very strong, both in legal and in
practical terms. According to the Municipality Act of the Federal State of Vorarlberg
(short. GG) provisions, mayors chair the municipal council and the municipal board.
They are chiefs of the communal administration and implement the decisions of the local
bodies. They have power over the municipal budget and represent the community to
the outside. The mayor can be, however, recalled from office by a majority of 2/3 of the
municipal council, irrespective of whether the election has been a conducted directly or not
(Art. 31 of the GG). Therefore, unlike in Ade (2014) and previous works on the German
reforms, the differences in the electoral procedures are associated only with differences in
the electoral motives of the mayor, and do not constitute a change from a ”parliamentary”
to a ”presidential” system. It is important to notice that the electoral reform of 2000 has
not changed any competences of the mayor.2
It is important to determine which categories of expenditure can be affected by the
municipalities, and thus by the mayors and which are determined by the higher levels of
2The last time that the competences of the mayors have changed was during the reforms of 1988 and
1994, when Austria has adapted its local self–governance laws to the European Union standards.
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government. Muncipalities have little power to decide on the expenditure on health and
security. Discretionary expenditure in the category education includes mostly management
of kindergartens and nurserys. The categories in which the communes have the most
discretionary powers are subsidies, transportation and management of streets and roads
and services.
2.2. Hypotheses
The literature offers a set of suggestions as for how electoral rules should affect the
fiscal outcomes. Firstly, the electoral rules systematically and independently of individual
characteristics of the mayor affect the probabilities of reelection. The probability of reelec-
tion in turn affects the incentives faced by the politicians in making expenditure decisions.
An important factor for determining the incentives of the local governments to manipu-
late the expenditure levels is the rule-dependent prospect of reelection. The general idea
behind electoral incentives is that elections may motivate politicians to act in the interest
of voters via the threat of not being re-elected. In reality, this may lead for example to
higher spending prior to an election, which may only be in the interest of voters in the
short run. A reasonable hypothesis is that when the mayor is elected directly, incentives
to exert effort in a way that is visible to voters are larger than in the opposite case system
because the incumbent needs the support of the electorate at large rather than only the
(typically guaranteed) support of his or her party to be re-elected.
Therefore, our main hypothesis is that whenever the mayor is elected directly, he or
she has an incentive to increase expenditure in the visible categories. With balance budget
requirements in place, this should be simultaneously associated with the need to decrease
expenditure levels in other categories of spending. Moreover, we do not expect a strong
decrease in the overall expenditure, as the municipalities do not have strong taxation
competences. Unlike in other federations such as Switzerland, own tax revenues constitute
a small fraction of the local revenue (in our sample the fraction of own taxation in the
overall revenue varies between 0.6% and 40% with an average of 15%). Therefore, the
mayors face a strong incentive to exhaust the allocated budgets. Additionally, since 1999
the Maastricht criteria have been applied also at the communal level, which means that the
yearly budget deficit cannot exceed 0.3% of GDP (this quota is further divided between
the communes and the states: for the more detailed description of the application please
refer to the Austrian Stability Pact.), that is the budget needs to be balanced. We expect,
therefore, that there will mostly be change in the composition rather than the level of
municipal spending: we expect a shift in the expenditure towards visible categories of
expenditure.
More formalized predictions as for impact of the electoral system on the incentive to
change the composition of spending can be derived from Drazen and Eslava (2010). The
two politicians’ types of Drazen and Eslava (2010): the “desks-type” and the “people-type”
correspond to the incentives schemes under the two voting systems. A desks-type politician
corresponds to the indirect system, as he or she needs to target his or her party to assure
reelection. In practical terms, he or she might have an incentive to invest in the actual
desks, that is bureaucracy. On the other hand, in the direct system, the politician targets
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the voters at large. Drazen and Eslava (2010) predict that the people-type spends overall
more resources on targeted policies, over the whole electoral period, wheres the desks-
type is expected to increase targeted spending only in the pre-electoral period. Given this
interpretation of the Drazen and Eslava (2010) model we can form the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Direct election of the mayor changes the composition of the expenditure,
towards targeted (visible) categories over the whole electoral period.
Hypothesis 2. Indirect election of the mayor is associated with a stronger political budget
cycle in the targeted expenditure.
3. Methodology and data
3.1. Data
The data comprise information for 96 municipalities in Vorarlberg between 1982 and
2013, a total of 2,634 observations. Fiscal and demographic data have been obtained from
the Austrian Statistical Office database, whereas electoral data have been collected from
the electoral database of Land Vorarlberg (Vorarlberg, 2015). Descriptive statistics of all
control variables can be found in Table 7 in the Appendix.
Figure 1 shows the mean expenditure levels in the two groups of municipalities: those
that have switched to the direct election of the mayor in 2000 and those which have not3.
Inspection of Figure 1 reveals the need for an empirical approach which, would take
into account the initial differences between the municipalities that have switched to the
direct election system in 2000 and those that have not. In most categories of expenditure we
observe systematic differences between the two groups. As explained in the next subsection
we shall address this issue by combining propensity score matching with the difference-in-
differences approach.
Dependent variables in the regressions are the expenditure levels per capita for the total
expenditure as well as subcategories of expenditure:
1. Public Administration
2. Security and Public Order
3. Education and Sport
4. Culture and Religion
5. Social Support and Housing
6. Health Protection
7. Transportation
8. Promotion of the Economy (i.e. Subsidies and grants to indursties and agriculture)
9. Services
3The length of the panel raises concern as whether the dependent variables are stationary. The results
of the panel unit root test, reported in Table 8 in the Appendix suggest that unit roots are not a concern
in our case.
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Figure 1: Trends in the dependent variables
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10. Finance (i.e. Debt payments)
11. Public Personnel
The main economic determinants of expenditure levels obviously include the overall
level of revenue (Revenue – per capita), as well as access to sources of taxation. We in-
clude two variables to describe the financing patterns: Local Taxes and Profit Shares. Local
taxes include taxes on local economic activities such as tourist taxes, administrative fees,
trade taxes, and property taxes as well as communal taxation, and reflect the economic
development of the region. Profit shares are the shares of the municipality in the general
taxation stemming from the fiscal equalization scheme. Fiscal equalization schemes are
negotiated within the parliament every four years and determine the shares of the mu-
nicipalities in the common taxation; these shares depend mostly on the population sizes
but also on the Financial Strength measured on the basis of tax base in property and the
3% municipal wage taxation (Kommunalsteuer). The overall revenue of a municipality
comprises additional grants and transfers, which are mostly earmarked.
Political variables have also been found in the literature to affect the levels of local
expenditure. Municipal elections in the region take place every five years, and in our
sample the relevant years are 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. We also control
for party effects with dummy variables: OV P for the Christian–democratic party, SPO
for the social–democratic party, and FPO for the populist Freedom Party of Austria, as
opposed to independent local commitees (base level). The dummy for OVP also measures
the vertical political alignment (in all analyzed periods the OVP party has won the state
elections), which has also been found (e.g. Bracco et al., 2013) to affect expenditure levels.
We also control for the fragmentation of the council (compare e.g. Houlberg and Pedersen,
2015): the variable HHI is the Herhfindal Index of the of the council seat share of the
parties. Additionally, we add a dummy SingleParty for the cases when the HHI equals 1,
therefore all council members come from the same party list. We control for the turnout
at the election and the level of political competition measured by the number of electoral
lists standing for the election, both before and after the electoral reform. Additionally we
control for the incumbency advantage, that is dummy Incumbent equals 1 if the current
mayor has been reelected. Dummy Divided equals 1 when the mayor in the direct election
comes from a different party than the majority in the municipal council.
Public expenditure at the local level is typically also determined by demographic and
geographic variables. These variables typically include the size of the population (Werck
et al., 2008; Costa-Font and Moscone, 2009) population density (Sanz et al., 2002), fraction
of the elderly and young inhabitants (Hayo and Neumeier, 2012; Veiga and Veiga, 2007),
unemployment rates (Foucault et al., 2008), and some country specific controls. We control
for all of these, however our measure of unemployment captures all members of the com-
munity who are aged between 15 and 64 years and who are not active in the employment
market (excluding students and pupils), and not only the individuals registered as unem-
ployed or actively seeking a job. Therefore, these numbers are in fact slightly higher than
the official unemployment rates. Since we dispose of information on the actual number of
retired persons, we use this variable instead of population over 65 in the regressions. In
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fact, in Austria Austria a large portion of the population, for various reasons, retires before
the usual legal age, and the actual number of retired inhabitants is, in this case, a much
better measure of demand for social services than the raw age structure.
3.2. Empirical methodology
The unique feature of the municipal elections in Vorarlberg is that the choice of the
electoral rule is chosen by each municipality and for each election separately. Therefore,
there is variation in the electoral rule both between and within the municipalities. This
variation is jointly determined by observable characteristics of the municipalities, as well as
potentially unobservable variables. Therefore, we combine propensity score matching with
difference-in-differences to address the issue of potential endogeneity of the rules. This
methodology can be summarized as follows:
1. In the first stage we calculate propensity scores for the municipalities on the basics
of exogenous characteristics between 1982 and 1990, using a probit model.
2. The propensity scores are used for a year–by–year kernel propensity score matching
using the Stata routine proposed by Villa (2014).
3. The weights derived from the kernel estimation are then used in the final difference–
in–differences regression with additional covariates.
The choice of the exogenous characteristics that enter the matching model is restricted
to the initial observed period, i.e. the first eight years. By this we want to avoid any changes
in the characteristics of the municipalities in the last two electoral periods before the reform,
which might happen in expectation of the changes (anticipation effect). Inclusion of the
initial outcome variable in the propensity score model should reflect the a priori preferences
for different types of expenditure intrinsic to each community.
The final model, results of which are presented, is therefore:
outcomeit =β0 + β1 · reformt + β2 · treatmentit + β3 · reformt ·Directit+ (1)
Γ · Xit + ui + vt + it weighted by weightsit,
where reformt defines the time span starting in the year 2000, treatmentit defines the
municipalities with directly elected mayor, β3 is the difference–in–differences estimator,
Xit is the vector of controls, and ui and vt are the municipality and time fixed effects,
respectively. weightsit denotes the analytical weights derived from the propensity score
matching procedure. In all regressions, all observations are included (unless explicitly
stated otherwise, in the case of robustness checks) with the weights equivalent to the
propensity scores.
The main regression formulation serves to test Hypothesis 1. We expect significant
differences in the composition of expenditure, with direct election associated with higher
targeted (visible) expenditure. To test Hypothesis 2, we look at the strength of the political
budget cycles and additionally analyze the interaction term between the budget cycle and
the direct election of the mayor. We expect the budget cycle to be present for both types
of electoral procedure, yet the cycle should prove stronger in the indirect system.
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In the first stage probit calculation of the propensity scores, we match the municipalities
on the basics of initial characteristics, that is values for years 1982 to 1990: the levels of
revenue per capita, local taxation per capita, profit shares per capita, and the initial values
of the outcome variables. Results of the probit estimations are presented in Table 1.
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Municipalities that receive higher shares of the tax revenue from the fiscal equaliza-
tion scheme are more likely to change to the direct election system afterwards. As for
individual categories of spending, higher probability of treatment occurs for municipalities
with initially higher levels of expenditure on healthcare and lower levels of expenditure
on public administration, security, and promotion of the economy. The probabilities of
the treatment are now used in the second stage to match the municipalities using kernel
density matching, on a year–by–year basis and for each expenditure category separately.
The choice of the kernel matching algorithm is dictated by practical purposes: there are
relatively few untreated observations in the sample, and the use of a matching algorithm
without replacement would result in a substantial loss of the available data.
Supports of the propensity scores are depicted in Figure 2 in the Appendix. Results of
the balancing of the outcome variables are presented in Figures 3 to 14 in the Appendix.
We can observe that the matching is reliable, and the common support is very broad.
Therefore, the estimated propensity scores can be reliably used in the next stage.4
Obviously, budgeting decisions in are not taken in separation from each other and the
expenditure shares in each subcategory are not independent: if a mayor wants to increase
expenditure in one direction, there needs to be a cutback in another. To account for these
additional restriction we re-stimate all equations, assuming a common error structure across
the equations (seemingly unrelated regression) and test whether the changes in expenditure
levels in each subcategory sum up to the overall change in expenditure5.
4. Results
Table 2 presents the main results of the estimations. Notice first that the propensity
score matching procedure has significantly reduced the initial bias: in the main results,
there are no statistically significant differences in the outcome variables dependent on
belonging to the treatment group (dummy Treatment). Low significance of the Treatment
dummy suggests, therefore, that the matching procedure was effective.
4For space–saving purposes we do not report the test results of balancing covariates; these can be
obtained from the author upon request.
5The personnel costs are excluded from the coefficient testing, since they do not constitute a separate
category, but overlap with other expenditure types.
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Table 4: Coefficients’ equality test.
χ2 1.479
p-val 0.224
In Table 5 we report the seemingly unrelated estimation results and test the assumption
that the subcategories need to equate to the overall change in the expenditure, in order to
verify the results6. We therefore test whether the coefficients on the difference-in-differences
across the equations (2) to (11) sum up to the coefficient in (1). The results are shown
in Table 4 and exhibit that the basic assumption about the interrelation between the
budgetary components is satisfied.
According to the results presented in Table 2, unlike in Ade (2014) the change to the
direct election of the mayor does not have an effect on the total level of expenditure. This
observation is, as mentioned, not surprising in the Austrian context. Most revenues are
obtained through fiscal equalization and transfers. Whereas higher financial autonomy
of municipalities would give a mayor an incentive to reduce inefficient expenditure, if
accompanied by a reduction in tax burden on the voters, this incentive is nonexistent for the
case of Austrian municipalities due to the common pool problem in taxation. As expected,
we observe a change in the composition of spending. After the reform, municipalities that
elect the mayor directly spend on average 35 Euro per capita less on public administration
(of 218 Euro on average, that is 16%), compared with those that have not changed the
electoral system. Similarly, we observe a drop in the expenditure on private services (91
Euro of the average 649 in this group of municipalities, that is 14%) and on personal costs
(32 Euro, 9% of the average). On the other hand, municipalities with directly elected
mayors spend more on transportation (79 Euro, 40% of the average) and promotion of the
economy (24 Euro, 20% of the average). The latter category comprises mostly subsidies
and grants to industries, agriculture, and forestry. Other categories of expenditure are
not affected by the reform. This finding is understandable in the context of the Austrian
federal structure, which leaves little decision–making power to the local authorities. Most
expenditure in the health and education sectors is regulated at the central or state level:
these are the so-called compulsory expenditures (Pflichtausgaben) that constitute a high
majority of health and education expenditures, and are legally predetermined (both in the
composition and size) at the higher level of government and cannot be changed by the
mayor in a discretionary way.
As for Hypothesis 2, Tables 2 and 3 reveal additional information. We read from Table
2, that the budget cycle exists in both types of electoral regime in the social expenditure,
and, but only weakly, in cultural expenditure. Table 3 additionally reveals that social
expenditure increases more ih the communes that elect the mayors directly over the whole
electoral period. The discrepancy between the significance of the Diff-in-Diff dummy be-
6Some differences in the coefficients between Tables 2 and 5 stem mostly from numerical differences in
the two different STATA routines used in the estimations: diff and suest.
15
tween Tables 2 and 3 stems from the inclusion of the interaction term between the cycle
and the direct election. No difference between the two systems in the overall social ex-
penditure can be, thus explained by the fact that this type of expenditure is generally
higher throught the electoral period in the direct system, whereas it increases stronly in
the pre–election year in the indirect system. These observations are precisely in line with
the predictions of Drazen and Eslava (2010) and Hypothesis 2. Other categories of the
expenditure do not show strong political cycles.
Although a direct assesment of the efficiency gains and economic effects cannot be con-
ducted with the available data, a switch from personnel and administrative expenditure
towards transportation infrastructure and subsidies to industries can be hypothesized to
have a positive impact on the long–term development of the local economy. Therefore,
although driven by electoral motives, budgetary conduct of directly elected mayors is as-
sociated with arguably more productive expenditure patterns, although we cannot exclude
the possibility that the subsidies involve corrupt behavior.
As for other political variables, concentration of power in the municipal council is
generally associated with higher total expenditure levels as well as expenditure on services
and personnel. We observe strong party effects in expenditure social support, and personnel
costs: left–wing mayors spend more on these categories and less on culture and economic
promotion. Moreover, in municipal cases where the mayor comes from one of the two main
national parties, OVP and SPO, the the expenditure in finance (repayment of debt) is
higher. In most categories of expenditure, whenever the directly elected mayor belongs to
a different party than the majority in the council, expenditure tends to be lower.
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4.1. Robustness analysis
Table 9 in the Appendix presents the results of the estimations that correct for the
potential outliers, thus taking into account the asymmetric distribution of the outcome
variables, including only the observations below the 90th percentile of the outcome vari-
able. By this, we eliminate some extreme values of the dependent variable, which might
contribute to the significance of the coefficients. Additionally, Table 10 in the Appendix
presents the results of the estimation without the municipalities with the city or market
status. These corrections do not change the main conclusions: a significant decrease in
the spending on public expenditure and personnel costs is observed. A known problem
whenever using propensity score matching is a potential for too low standard errors, as
estimation steps add variation beyond the normal sampling variation. One way to deal
with this problem is to use bootstrapping as suggested e.g. by Lechner (2002), amongst
others. Table 11 in the Appendix presents the results of the estimation with bootstrapped
standard errors.
In all robustness checks we can observe that the main pattern of the results remains
visible. A decrease in the administrative expenditure remains in all cases significant at 1%
level. The same is true for the drop in the personnel expenditure. Exclusion of cities and
markets as well as bootstrapping the errors does not change any of the main conclusions
about the significance and signs of the positive coefficients on transportation and promotion
of the economy variables. The effect on the promotion of the economy does however turn
insignificant if we remove the 10% of the observations with the highest expenditure levels
by each category.
5. Conclusions
It is often hypothesized that a direct election of a president or a mayor can lead to a
reduction in the size of the public sector. In this work, we show that the local expenditure
levels are not necessarily lower if the mayor is elected directly. In our sample, this result
relies on the fact that local governments self-finance their activities to a limited extent.
Unlike in the case of Swiss municipalities, which rely mostly on their own taxation, Austrian
local governors face incentives to keep expenditure levels high. The common pool problem
in this case does not allow for a full expression of fiscal responsibility.
We do find, however, that the composition of spending changes in the municipalities
with directly elected mayors: the expenditures on public adminstration, public personnel,
and public services are lower, whereas expenditure of infrastructure and subsidies to the
economy increases. We link the latter finding to the opportunistic behavior of mayors,
who wish to guarantee reelection by shifting expenditure towards visible categories. Op-
portunistic behavior in this case, however, can be associated with positive effects for the
economy: a shift from administrative expenditure to investments in the infrastructure and
subsidies for the economy can contribute to stimulating the long–term growth of the region.
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Appendix
Table 6: Summary statistics of the outcome variables
No Change Change to Direct
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff. (t-test)
Total Expenditure 2688.111 2365.352 2106.484 1621.859 -6.441
Administration 291.119 210.122 213.56 135.966 -9.735
Security 95.52 190.921 52.528 77.523 -6.131
Education 298.928 239.441 313.101 273.327 1.385
Culture 52.136 70.192 60.212 82.667 2.620
Social 146.925 128.269 175.2 127.759 5.260
Health 106.241 101.186 142.163 189.849 6.644
Transport 175.793 229.784 176.551 222.966 0.006
Economy 217.752 419.033 120.377 330.404 -6.001
Services 994.706 1321.105 635.425 724.01 -7.309
Finance 308.815 511.054 224.92 387.57 -4.215
Personnel 306.102 289.319 335.64 237.402 2.425
Table 7: Summary statistics of the control variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
HHI 0.623 0.301 0 1
Turnout 0.854 0.115 0.485 1
Lists 2.465 1.353 1 8
Unemployment 0.243 0.137 0.022 0.097
Profit Shares 539.527 225.619 175.300 1882.694
Taxes 427.751 570.209 37.856 6050.783
Revenue 2299.323 1895.870 492.705 22601.465
Young 0.186 0.040 0.031 0.363
Retired 0.135 0.028 0.015 0.236
Pop Density 236.408 276.060 7.931 1299.034
Inhabitants 3721.462 6318.428 128 45922
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Table 8: Unit root tests of the dependent variables (including deterministic trends)
Im-Pesaran-Shin Z-tilde Fisher ADF Mod. Inv χ2
Total expendiutre -19.68 32.75
Administration -19.25 35.80
Security -24.38 59.77
Education -18.78 27.30
Culture -20.29 41.15
Social -18.12 26.85
Health -16.43 24.81
Transport -20.25 40.95
Economy -21.28 42.43
Services -20.53 37.49
Finance -23.44 55.81
Personnel -6.41 3.81
Figure 2: Propensity scores
22
Figure 3: Matching on the outcome variable: Total Expenditure
Figure 4: Matching on the outcome variable: Administration
23
Figure 5: Matching on the outcome variable: Security
Figure 6: Matching on the outcome variable: Education
24
Figure 7: Matching on the outcome variable: Culture
Figure 8: Matching on the outcome variable: Social
25
Figure 9: Matching on the outcome variable: Health
Figure 10: Matching on the outcome variable: Transport
26
Figure 11: Matching on the outcome variable: Economy
Figure 12: Matching on the outcome variable: Services
27
Figure 13: Matching on the outcome variable: Finance
Figure 14: Matching on the outcome variable: Personnel
28
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